Section 548 Given Extraterritorial Application

The case of In re French, 440 F.3d 145 (4th Cir. 2006) presented the question of whether a U.S. Bankruptcy Court can avoid a constructively fraudulent transfer of foreign real estate between U.S. residents. The court held that the presumption against extraterritoriality, assuming it applied, did not prevent the application of the fraudulent transfer statute and that the doctrine of international comity did not require application of Bahamian bankruptcy law rather than the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.

In this case, the Chapter 7 trustee filed an adversary proceeding to avoid the transfer of the Bahamian real property by the debtor to her children. The trustee alleged that the debtor and the transferees had engaged in a constructively fraudulent transfer because the debtor had been insolvent at the time of the transfer and received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange. See 11 USC section 548(a)(1)(B). The transferees filed a motion to dismiss and argued that the section 548 should not apply to foreign property based on the presumption against extraterritoriality and that considerations of international comity counseled the application of Bahamian rather than U.S. bankruptcy law.

The court noted that it is a principle of American law that legislation of Congress is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdictio of the U.S. unless a contrary intent appear. The court stated that although the parties had assumed that the application of section 548 to the transfer here is extraterritorial, the court needed to consider whether the presumption against extraterritorial application applies at all. The court noted that the U.S., courts only apply this presumption against extraterritoriality when a party seeks to enforce a statute beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991). The presumption has no bearing when the conduct which Congress seeks to regulate occurs largely within the U.S., ie. when regulated conduct is domestic rather than extraterritorial. Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 531 (D.C.Cir.1993).

The court stated that although it had never defined when conduct is extraterritorial for purposes of the presumption, it has recognized that a similar inquiry-defining “foreign conduct”-is particularly challenging in cases (like this one) that involve a “mixture of foreign and domestic elements.” Dee-K Enters., Inc. v. Heveafil Sdn. Bhd., 299 F.3d 281, 286 (4th Cir.2002).The court concluded that a flexible test taking into account all component events of the transfer is appropriate to determine whether an allegedly fraudulent transfer occurred
extraterritorially. The court noted that the perpetrator and most of the victims of the fraudulent transfer were located in the U.S and the effects of this transfer were felt most strongly in the U.S. and not in the Bahamas. The court also found significant that domestic facts and conduct established both of the elements of the section 548 constructively fraudulent transfer, ie. the insolvency of the debtor and the receipt of less than a reasonably equivalent value. The court found the recordation of the deed in the Bahamas as insignificant as a foreign fact or conduct. The court though did recognize as important the fact that the real property was located in the Bahamas as the law has long recognized the powerful interest that states and nations have in the real property within their boundaries and that the strength of that interest explains why the law of the situs generally applies to real property.

But the court held that it need not resolve the “slippery question” of whether there was extraterritorial application as even if it were assumed that the application of the Bankruptcy Code would be extraterritorial, the presumption against extraterritoriality does not prevent its application to the transfer herein. The court concluded that the presumption must give way when Congress exercises its undeniable authority to enforce its laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States as it did with section 548.

The transferees next argued that even if the presumption against extraterritoriality does not prevent extension of section 548 to the transaction, that the court should refrain from applying the statute under the doctrine of international comity, particularly as this is a dispute concerning real property which should be governed by the law of the situs. The court reviewed what the Supreme Court has referred to as the factors as to the application of the doctrine of international comity and concluded that these factors did not require the court to refrain from applying the U.S. Bankruptcy Code in favor of Bahamian bankruptcy law.

Jordan E. Bublick, Attorney at Law, Practice Limited to Bankruptcy Law, Board Certified Specialist in Consumer Bankruptcy Law (American Board of Certification), Member of the Florida Bar since 1983

Foreign Creditor May Be Sanctioned for Violating Court Injunction

The issue before the court in the pre-BAPCPA case of In re Simon, 153 F.3d 991 (9th Cir.1998), cert. denied 525 U.S. 114 (US 1999) was whether a foreign creditor is subject to U.S. bankruptcy court sanction for pursuing foreign collection of a debt discharged in a U.S. bankruptcy case in which the foreign creditor participated. The court concluded that the bankruptcy court may sanction the foreign creditor for violating a court injunction.

The Debtor William N. Simon filed for chapter 7 relief in the U.S. and obtained his discharge of debt. Pursuant to section 524, the discharge order operates as an injunction against the collection of certain debt against the debtor. Simon scheduled Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corp., Ltd. (“HSBC”) as a creditor in his case and HSBC filed a proof of claim in the bankruptcy case. HSBC filed a complaint seeking declaratory relief from the bankruptcy court that the bankruptcy discharge injunction was not effective outside of the U.S.

The court found that Congress has the unquestioned authority to enforce its laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the U.S., but whether Congress has exercised that authority in a particular case is a matter of statutory construction. Unless a contrary intent appears, there is a presumption that the legislation of Congress is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S.

The court concluded that as to actions against the bankruptcy estate, Congress clearly intended extraterritorial application of the Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy court obtains exclusive in rem jurisdiction over all of the property of the estate including property located outside of the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S. The court concluded that Congress intended extraterritorial application of the Bankruptcy Code as its applies to property of the estate. The court further noted that as a matter of general principle, protection of in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction is a sufficient basis for a court to restrain another court’s proceedings and that this rationale extends to foreign proceedings.

The court noted that the more difficult question was whether a bankruptcy court may enjoin a foreign collection action against the debtor personally or as to non-estate assets if the creditor was not a party to the U.S. bankruptcy proceedings. But the court was not required to reach this question as HSBC fully participated in Simon’s U.S. bankruptcy case and thereby surrendered to U.S. jurisdiction. In this instance, the presumption against the extraterritorial effect of a statute would not apply. Therefore, Simon’s chapter 7 discharge injunction enjoins HSBC, but not the courts in Hong Kong. If HSBC chooses to commence collection proceedings in Hong Kong against Simon, it does so at the risk of U.S. bankruptcy court sanction.

The court rejected HSBC’s argument that it only submitted itself to limited bankruptcy court jurisdiction as the proof of claim it submitted in Simon’s case was for a different debt than the one it sought to pursue in Hong Kong. The court noted that HSBC failed to assert its position in the bankruptcy court by requesting abstention, to move to lift the automatic stay, to move for adequate protection, or to file an objection to discharge of Simon’s debts.

The court noted that it did not decide whether discharge injunction of section 524 itself applies extraterritorially in all cases either as to non-estate assets or as to the debtor’s personal liability.

The court also rejected HSBC’s arguement that international comity requires the court to vacate the bankruptcy court’s injunction forbidding debt collection against Simon for pre-petition debt. The court noted that the international comity concerns underlying Maxwell Communications Corp., 93 F.3d 1036, 1050 (2d Cir. 1996) were not present in this case.

The court noted that the Bankruptcy Code does not codify either the “territorial theory” or the “universalist philosphy” but provides for a flexible approach to international insolvencies dependent upon the circumstances of the particular case. Under the territorial theory or “grab” rule, courts in each national jurisdiction are responsible for seizing and controlling assets within their geographic reach. The universalist philosophy contemplates one plenary transnational proceeding governing the administration of assets world-wide. The court noted in this pre-BAPCPA case, that if the Bankruptcy Code contains any philosophy it is of deference to the country where the primary insolvency proceeding is located and flexible cooperation in administration of assets. e.g. Sections 304 and 305.

In summary, the court held that the lower court’s order did not involve an improper extrterritorial application of the discharge injunction as to estate property becaus section 541 expressly includes all of the debtor’s property regardless of geographic location. The discharge injunction was also validly applied to HSBC as to Simon’s non-estate property because HSBC participated in Simon’s bankruptcy case and thereby subjected itself to the otherwise valid orders of the bankruptcy court. Finally, international comity did not compel a contrary result because there was no conflicting proceeding in a foreign nation.

Jordan E. Bublick, Attorney at Law, Practice Limited to Bankruptcy Law, Board Certified Specialist in Consumer Bankruptcy Law (American Board of Certification), Member of the Florida Bar since 1983